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A Whiteheadian Innervation of the Soma: A New 
Vision for the Peripheral Nervous System 
 
David Milliern1 
California Institute of Integral Studies 
Abstract: This essay draws attention to two problems in neuroscience’s set of 
assumptions. These self-defeating assumptions include: 1) the assumption that what the 
nervous system, especially the brain, does is synthesize experience, while also assuming 
philosophical realism, and 2) the problem of biological signal transduction. In the latter, 
neuroscientists and philosophers of biology have left unaddressed the issue that the signal 
differences between the inside and outside of the organismic boundary are of distinct 
ontological types; and yet no concern has been expressed regarding how it is possible that 
an organism’s inner states could reflect the experiential content flowing from outside of 
the organism’s boundary. To resolve this problem, I propose that the process philosophy 
of Whitehead be implemented to adjust our understanding of what body is and how the 
peripheral nervous system draws in experience through the senses. Some discussion will 
surround the enteric nervous system, regarding the evolutionary past of organisms, the 
thought that enteric nervous system probably played the role of the brain in our 
evolutionary ancestors, and how Whitehead’s philosophy of organism can help bring 
some understanding to this anti-Cartesian idea.    
 
Keywords: Whitehead, nervous system, process philosophy, cognition, neuroscience, 
metaphysics, panpsychism, panexperientialism 
 
 
In the theory and philosophy extending from 
the time of Galen, the supremacy of the brain 
as seat of cognition and consciousness has 
been on the rise.  Perhaps the final anointing 
of this supremacy came when Descartes 
(1641/2017, p. 18) introduced res cogitans, 
and then put it in strict localized interaction 
with the brain. The centrality of the brain’s 
role in consciousness and cognition appears 
almost fixed in the times of modern 
neuroscience and cognitive studies. Some 
challenges to the centrality of goings-on in 
the cranium have arisen, but there has yet to 
be head-on challenge presenting a framework 
that seeks to substantially contradict the 
contemporary commonsense assumption, 
 
1 Correspondence - dmilliern@mymail.ciis.edu 
namely, as far as consciousness and cognitive 
activity is concerned it is all in the head.  
 
The following article begins with an 
illustration that the central philosophical 
tenets of the mechano-reductionistic 
theoretical framework of brain and cognitive 
sciences are grounded in contradictions. I 
will proceed from there, explaining how 
considerably more sense and consistency can 
be brought to understanding the 
consciousness as processes, though in 
radically different terms than those of the 
analytically-minded approach to brain 
science. The cost of this consistency comes 
with the humility of accepting limitations to 
1
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the interpretation of contemporary science, 
and this cost may be termed “mystery.”  The 
admission of this mystery comes by way of 
implementing the ontological and 
metaphysical framework of Alfred North 
Whitehead to the peripheral nervous system 
(PNS), which forces us to remove emphases 
on the centrality of the brain by lifting the 
tyranny of the eye. By the end of this article, 
the previous clause will be made clear, as we 
dispose of the erroneous presupposition that 
the realm of visual contents necessarily and 




There are two distinct arguments that arise 
out of assumptions made by contemporary 
sciences of the brain and cognition, which, in 
themselves, seem to destroy the entire 
interpretive framework of theoretical science. 
I will call these: (a) the argument from 
hallucination; (b) the argument from cellular 
signal transduction. In addition to these two 
arguments this article will find its motivation 
in a discussion regarding the death of 
mechanistic philosophy, which has almost 
entirely gone under the radar possibly 
because of scientists and analytic 
philosophers continuing their post-wake 
mornings hundreds of years later. 
 
It doesn’t seem to have clicked for most 
scientists and contemporary philosophers 
that the aspect of synthesis within the 
framework of modern understandings of 
what the brain does falls victim to a 
congenital illness. This congenital illness is 
that which has been inherited from Kant’s 
transcendental idealism. First, an 
examination of the contemporary 
neuroscientific perspective will assist in 
establishing the prevailing mindset, and then 
the connection to Kant’s synthetic approach 
will appear more readily. I have chosen Anil 
Seth, professor of Cognitive and 
Computational Neuroscience at the 
University of Sussex, to represent the popular 
interpretation of what the brain is and does. 
In an interview, he characterized the popular 
view as follows: “In the story I'm going to tell 
you, our conscious experiences of the world 
around us, and of ourselves within it, are 
kinds of controlled hallucinations that happen 
with, through and because of our living 
bodies” (Seth and Raz, 2018) Any kind of 
inner synthesis of experience is going to beg 
the question, inquiring into the nature of that 
experience’s connection to what is external. 
As soon as one commits to this manner of 
thinking, there is an immediate schism to the 
generation of “inner states” and whatever 
might be objectively external to that state. 
Kant’s transcendental framework admits no 
discernible way to connect the noumenal 
realm to the phenomenal realm with explicit 
detail, except to stipulate that the ground 
phenomenal experience is grounded in 
things-in-themselves that make up the 
noumenal realm (Stang, 2016). Detailing 
Kant’s framework, where passively given 
raw data of experience have categories 
imposed upon the collective sense content 
through the imagination in time and resulting 
in a transcendental unity of apperception, 
leaves one open to whether there is any need 
for an external ground to the “resultant” 
objects of perception (Rosenberg, 2005). 
With a little examination, it is clear that our 
everyday use of the word “hallucination” 
entails a baseline for reference: we know 
what it is like to not hallucinate, which 
provides a point of comparison for when our 
conscious experience includes items that 
might not be there. It is, indeed, a natural step 
to say that if all experience is synthesized, 
then it is a hallucination, because the 
implication is that there is no way to 
corroborate that the synthesized contents of 
experience really reflect anything external to 
that experience. This is one of a number of 
reasons why Kant (1787/1997, p. 112) 
2
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correctly saw the need to distinguish contents 
of perception from the underlying real things 
that give rise to them, and it is also why, even 
if stated more for shock value, Seth is correct 
in characterizing the modern neuroscientific 
view as a sort of hallucination. The difference 
between the two characterizations is that the 
neuroscientific view believes that the 
contents of the mind conform to the objects 
in the world, whereas objects conform to the 
mind for Kant (Segall, 2019, p. 94) 
 
If the modern neuroscientific view is that the 
world that I have access to is constructed, 
then I have to question what in my 
consciousness reflects what is outside while 
also not taking for granted that there is an 
outside. There are trees and also brains, 
which is strangely self-contradictory. For it is 
perceptual information about brains, through 
an interpretative filter of what the brain does 
(i.e., constructs experience), that first gives 
rise to the thinking that one has no grounds to 
believe that there is a brain to begin with. The 
rationale follows a cycle that self-refutes as 
follows: 
 
Figure 1: The hallucination narrative cycle. 
A) Phenomenal experience naively indicates that there are brains. 
B) Phenomenal experience indicates brain processes. 
C) Brain processes are interpreted to construct experience. 
D) The contents of experience cannot be verified to exist independent of synthesis, thus we 
have no ground to affirm contents of A, and no real reason to think A is the case. 
 
The neuroscientific interpretation implicitly 
rests upon a strange assumption that naïve 
realism is the case, and that whatever one 
experiences must, by virtue of being 
experienced, be real. This is strange in the 
sense that philosophy has battered the view 
from pillar to post, as one might see the 
collective progression of philosophy and 
science as a move away from naively 
accepting the contents of experience, refining 
the concepts of naïve experience, 
reformulating metaphysics, and using these 
to develop empirical methodological 
research programs. The assumption, which is 
very likely and completely outside the 
conscious acknowledgement of scientists, is 
particularly strange in its inclusion here 
because as Seth (Seth and Raz, 2018) says, 
experience is constructed in the 
neuroscientific view. Experience cannot be 
both a fabrication of internal processes and 
the product of what is immediately drawn in 
by the internal-external sensory interface of 
the organism. Therefore, neuroscience seems 
to implement a D* condition in the above 
cycle, which states something along the lines 
of “but while we can’t be sure that the first 
order contents of A have a positive 
ontological status, naïve realism affords these 
contents ontological affirmation.” I see no 
possible means of rational generosity that 
would remove this contradiction. However, 
matters get worse from here for modern 
interpretation of the brain sciences. 
3
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Quite possibly, the problem of cellular signal 
transduction has gone completely unnoticed 
in the philosophy of science and in the 
empirical interpretation of neuroscience. 
Signal transduction is the “transformation of 
sensory stimulus energy into a cellular signal, 
such as a receptor potential” (Bear et al., 
2016). Since one of the focuses of this article 
is to challenge the tyranny of the eye, so to 
speak, I will adduce phototransduction in 
rods within the eye as the example. In fact, 
cones work similarly, and the argument that 
follows could just as easily have included 
Merkel disks instead of photoreceptor cells. 
The process of signal transduction can be 
stated with varying levels of complexity, but 
some of these details are cropped for 
purposes of emphasizing salient features of 
the process that are relevant to the present 
discussion. The step-by-step process of 
signal transduction in photoreceptor cells, 
called rods, is as follows: 
 
1. Electromagnetic waves incident upon the rhodopsin (photopigment). 
2.  Retinal in the opsin absorbs the electromagnetic energy. 
3. The absorption means molecular changes in the retinal within the opsin, inducing 
“activation.” 
4. Transducin (the relevant G-protein) is stimulated. 
5. Photodiesterase (PDE), the effector enzyme, is activated. 
6. PDE activity reduces the cGMP level. 
7. Na+ channels close and the cell is hyperpolarized (Bear et al., 2016, pp. 312-315)  
 
From here, the signals pass through direct 
and indirect pathways to the bipolar cells and 
eventually into the central visual system. 
While these physiological steps may not 
seem to say much about the general theory of 
neuroscience, I contend very much to the 
contrary, as there is a tremendously important 
disjunction present, as theorized by biology, 
between the inner organism and that which is 
external. The philosophical problem is that 
what is outside of the organism is not what is 
inside of the organism. The question I pose 
is: How is it possible for cognitive processes 
to take what is at the internal periphery of the 
organism, and extract from the subsequent 
concatenation of physical phenomena a 
remotely accurate model of the external 
world? Simply put in declarative form: what 
is outside is not what is inside, and so the 
neuroscientist cannot claim that the outside 
world has anything to do with the inner 
world. In fact, these internal signals are not 
what is outside, so one arrives at a similar 
complication as pointed out in figure 1. 
Namely, that the eye is trusted in giving us 
accurate information about the world, and 
then the interpretation of those phenomenal 
goings-on tell us that there is a schism that 
undermines the flow of reliable information 
into the organism. If the final upshot of all of 
these processes, conscious experience, 
cannot determine that there is a world behind 
its veil of perception, then the experiencer is 
not justified in claiming that there is an 
external world. 
 
The general conclusion of the above 
arguments is that they are out of touch with 
reality, and empirical science cannot pretend 
to knowledge if it undermines the mode of 
access it has to reality. The resolution 
proposed later in this article when looking at 
the PNS, will be to ground the interpretation 
of neuroscience in a philosophical framework 
that is realistic, and which affirms that the 
organism is in touch with its environment 
through philosophically realist means. 
 
4
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 5 
The interpretive component in both of the 
foregoing arguments against the modern 
neuroscientific understandings – and we may 
as well, with some reservation, include 
contemporary biology – are problematic in 
their mechanistic assumptions. The history of 
physics includes a rarely cited problem, so 
rarely cited that it doesn’t really have a proper 
name, sometimes called the boundary 
problem in mechanics, the contact problem, 
or the argument against collisions. The key to 
all of mechanical philosophy, as in the 
Descartes’ philosophy (Gaukroger, 2010, p. 
5), was that two disjoint things made of the 
same substance, in this case matter, could 
influence the motions of one another through 
contact. The problem is really nothing more 
than the simple quandary of how it is possible 
for two objects, like to iron balls, to come into 
contact. If one gives the question the 
appropriate moment’s pause, it seems that 
contact might occur at infinitesimal points, 
but the issue with this is that the meaning of 
infinitesimal points being in contact doesn’t 
lend itself to sensible physical interpretation 
(Hagar, 2014, pp. 14-19). At the instant of 
first contact, it appears that mathematical 
conceptions of accumulation points, after the 
concepts of Real Analysis, does not make for 
intelligible physical behavior.  
 
For my part, I think the historical 
commentary on mechanistic thinking is 
almost fully laid out by Noam Chomsky in 
his 1992 lecture in Spain, at the University of 
Girona. In that lecture he said that the idea of 
Cartesian dualism didn’t survive the century, 
but many mistakenly think that the Cartesian 
notion of mind or, as Ryle referred to it, the 
notion of the “ghost” was done away with it. 
Quite to the contrary, the problem of contact 
in mechanistic philosophy was dealt with by 
Newton, and it would be that Newton’s work 
“exorcised” the machine, not the ghosts, but 
that rather it would be ghosts all the way 
down after that (Chomsky, 1992). I say 
“almost” above, as the replacement of action 
at a distance was partial, being that the 
conception of gravity as distal agent of 
influence was only a partial overturning of 
problem of contact; and it would be, as 
Chomsky says, ghosts all the way down, once 
the idea of electrical fields would come into 
their own. This is the reason that, historically, 
the exorcism of the machine went unnoticed: 
the exorcism was done piecemeal beginning 
with the universal law of gravitation, and 
then being completed with the works in 
electrical fields and the general notion of the 
atom as comprised of these fields. Chomsky 
doesn’t mention the importance of these 
latter notions in completing the exorcism, but 
he does note that the exorcism was taken 
somewhat more seriously later.  
 
In fact, I would actually say that the 
disjunction between science and philosophy 
that grew out of the early 20th century where, 
as Goldman (2006) notes, scientists 
differentiated and separated themselves from 
philosophers only to begin doing their own 
philosophy without knowledge of proper 
philosophical training, which ultimately 
contributed to the strong reemergence of 
mechanical philosophical assumptions. For 
instance, advancements in science in the 17th 
and 18th centuries looked far less 
mechanistic, where Galvani (Pera, 
1986/1992, p. xix) argued for the existence of 
“animal electricity” Driesch (1905/1914, p. 
14) argued on behalf of a vitalism in biology, 
and romantic thinker Hans Christian Ørsted 
(Gillesberg, 2009, p. 27) discovered the 
holistic nature of electricity and magnetism. 
Therefore, the split between philosophy and 
science resulted in scientists not knowing of 
the exorcism and previous problems in 
philosophy or the history of science. They 
began taking up naïve realist views and, 
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That’s why contemporary discussion 
ridiculing the ghost in the machine is 
completely off track. In my opinion, it’s just 
missing the point in what happened. What did 
not survive is the theory of the machine – 
contact mechanics was thrown out. I’m being 
somewhat anachronistic when I say that the 
17th century exorcised mechanical 
philosophy. It did, in principle, but it didn’t 
yet do it, in fact. One consequence of 
eliminating the machine is that we have 
gotten rid of any notion of body, physical, or 
material. There is no longer any notion of a 
material world. Remember, Descartes could 
be a dualist because he had a notion of body, 
not a very clear notion, but at least a general 
notion, given by the fact that a body is res 
extensa, an extended sort of thing (Descartes, 
1641/2017, p. 13), “Body” is defined by 
mechanical philosophy, by contact 
mechanics, that’s body, as in the case of the 
universal law of gravitation, as it requires 
action at a distance. Now, Newton (Smith, 
2007) showed that’s not the way a body 
works; therefore, we have no conception of 
body. In fact, there’s just the world, whatever 
it is. Unless someone comes up with a new 
notion of the physical, talking about 
physicalism, materialism, eliminative 
materialism, or the mind-body problem, is 
meaningless. If you have no notion of 
material, there can be no problem of reducing 
things to the material; and there is no notion 
of material (Chomsky, 1992). Chomsky 
(1992) goes on to say that the entire field, 
presumably the field of all cognitive and 
brain sciences, is composed of discussion that 
he says is not merely wrong but downright 
meaningless. There may be no item more 
crucial than this point about whether there 
can be any such notion of “material” or 
“mechanism” without contact, as every 
initiate of neuroscience reads textbooks laden 
with the words “mechanical,” “mechanism,” 
and “matter.” For example, “ACh 
(acetylcholine) and all the molecular 
machinery associated with it are collectively 
called the cholinergic system” (Bear et al., 
2016, p. 145). The training literature for these 
brain-oriented disciplines is rife with these 
references, which are meaningless. 
 
This now serves as the segue into the primary 
purpose of this article, which is to implement 
a philosophical framework for neuroscience 
to make sensible commentary on the nature 
of consciousness. To do this I will explore 
how the metaphysical and ontological aspects 
of Whitehead’s speculative philosophy alters 
the interpretive understanding of what the 
brain does, and neuroscience, more 
generally.  
 
Enter the Philosophy of Organism 
 
In the motivation, two preeminent points rise 
above all others: a) the need for philosophical 
realism to justify and certify that internal 
states reflect the external world; b) to address 
the exorcism of mechanistic philosophy and 
the concept of matter. In purview of these 
items needing correcting, it is not arbitrary 
that an examination of Whitehead’s 
philosophy has been called forth to rectify the 
ailing scientific interpretation. Recent 
developments in the philosophy of mind, 
regarding the PNS, further supports the 
choice of Whitehead’s philosophy, as will be 
discussed shortly. Whitehead’s philosophy of 
organism does away with substance, and it 
provides a return to realism. Whitehead 
achieves a return to realism by regarding all 
bits of existence as being the same in their 
type, as in each atomic bit being like others 
in metaphysical kind, which we can refer to 
for simplicity either as “actual occasions” or 
“drops of experience” (Whitehead, 
1929/1985, p. 18). Within Whitehead’s 
ontology, there is also very deliberate room 
made for a pluralism of perspectives, such as 
viewing the world as waves, which, like the 
process metaphysics that allows for drops of 
6
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experience to merge and concresce, one can 
understand how waves might superimpose. 
In the way that multiple waves can enter into 
superposition in a given location, so can 
actual occasions. Unlike waves, actual 
occasions do not pass through one another 
unaltered, but participate in a process of 
becoming. This is the first insight. 
 
The argument regarding cellular signal 
transduction instantiates a divide between the 
inside and outside of the organism, such that 
what is outside and coming toward the 
organism’s periphery must be considered 
fundamentally different from what is 
immediately inside the cellular boundary. In 
other words, the only concept in common 
between the outside of the organism and the 
inside is energy, but that is the only 
commonality. It is doubtful that a completely 
disjoint inner world might be able to connect 
meaningfully to the outer world in a way that 
the information or experience on the different 
sides of the boundary are somehow the same, 
but in different forms. The signals outside are 
thermally radiative, electromagnetic, or 
mechanical waves, whereas the signals inside 
are propagations of potential difference along 
membranes of neurons.2 To reiterate, if not 
entirely dismissed outright on the grounds of 
the disjunction induced by signal 
transduction. At the very least, the 
neuroscientific view is left in a logically 
 
2 Even in the plurality of ways in which one may look 
at the movement of electrical qualities in the nervous 
system, there is emphasis on the difference between 
what is inside the organismic boundary and what is 
outside. Whether one takes the view that the 
propagation of action potential is the consequence of 
ionic solutions vacillating and oscillating across 
membranes of a single neuron or as if electrons were 
flowing in direct-current-like conditions, both have 
pragmatically acceptable claims to the reality of what 
is happening (Allen, 2013). One need only consider 
the Volta-Galvani debate to see the more primitive 
version of this argumentation (see Marcello Pera’s 
The Ambiguous Frog: The Galvani-Volta 
inconsistent anti-realist position where it has 
undermined the very features of perception 
(i.e., seeing stuff going on in the brain) that 
first gave rise to the scientific field’s 
understanding. Understanding experience as 
hallucinatory, in that experience is 
constructed, seems to obviate the apparent 
function of neural sensory pathways: of what 
service is a set of sensory systems to an 
organism if these pathways do not accurately 
reflect what is outside of the organism? The 
newly gained insight of Whitehead’s 
philosophy of organism allows an 
interpretive view that does away with this 
problem entirely. That is, the “signals,” to be 
crude, are of the same ontological type inside 
the organism as they were outside, namely, 
actual occasions. The many concrescing 
contents of these complex, interdependent 
drops of experience might mean that the 
contents of experience, as they enter into the 
organism, are not quite what they were 
outside of the organism. But the type of 
goings-on outside are the same inside, and 
thus we have a fully satisfactory realism that 
justifies that what is being experienced by the 
organism is largely consistent with what is 
going on outside of it. With some of the 
preliminary points addressed, regarding how 
the problems in the motivation will be 
addressed with Whitehead’s sophisticated 
and radical philosophy of organism, I need to 
address advances in the philosophy of mind 
Controversy on Animal Electricity) and reflect upon 
this with the matured American Pragmatic thought of 
Baas C. van Fraasen’s The Scientific Image. From 
this, the various ways, as a collection, in which we 
can look at what is happening inside of the organism 
is certainly in no obvious way what is happening 
outside of the organism; and from the 
phenomenological vantage point, there is no 
guarantee that what one is receiving on their 
“television screen” is what is happening in front of 
the “camera” or sensors, outside the organism. 
However, thanks to Whitehead, we are not left to talk 
of a noumenal realm, as Kant’s solution to the 
problems of early modern philosophy led him. 
7
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involving the PNS. Once that is complete, a 
deeper discussion of a Whiteheadian 
innervation (and invigoration) will be 
possible. 
 
The Growing Importance of the 
Peripheral Nervous System to the 
Philosophy of Mind 
 
The Peripheral Mind by István Aranyosi 
deserves a great deal of attention for its 
powerful and original approach to 
understanding consciousness. Aranyosi’s 
approach is one that, if not fully grokked in 
its subtleties, may be difficult to distinguish 
from embodied mind. He frames his view 
differently, so as to interpret “the mind as 
truly distributed over the body… I would 
rather call my approach ‘enminded body’ 
than ‘enbodied mind’” (Aranyosi, 2013, p. 
xi). The impetus of Aranyosi’s thinking on 
this subject derives from his personal 
experiences of cancer treatment that caused 
him to lose the use of his limbs, as if his mind 
no longer extended to these peripheral 
domains of his body – only later to regain 
control, having them re-enminded, so to 
speak. There is a certain sense that, upon 
losing access to his limbs, Aranyosi’s 
inner/outer boundary, or his subject/object 
boundary, moved in such a way that his mind 
lost ground: “The mind-world boundary 
seems to have moved from the 
skin/environment junction to the 
innervated/denervated junction within the 
body. So, part of the body has become 
external to the mind, or ‘deminded’” 
(Aranyosi, 2013, p. 10). Interestingly, when 
one typically thinks about the skin as being 
the interface between the organism and the 
environment, the idea of this boundary 
moving fails to be a consideration. That is 
one point that lends so much originality and 
power to Aranyosi’s book. 
 
In addition to the original contributions of the 
book Aranyosi adduces, from across the 
philosophy of mind literature, some 
compelling points about the distributional 
aspect of experiential states.  
 
“[S]ensory states, like pain, are not 
accounted for by a definite place in 
the brain, but as a continuous 
interaction among the peripheral 
nerve fibers, the spinal cord, and 
several areas of the brain. This means 
that a neuroscientific account of these 
states will involve large areas of both 
the CNS and the PNS, and that the 
state itself is therefore most naturally 
understood as a distributional 
property of the nervous system, 
where what is distributed is electrical 
activity” (Aranyosi, 2013, pp. 14-15). 
 
There are two tacit thoughts feeding into this 
on that Aranyosi (2013) is expressing. The 
first is that neuroscience and its philosophical 
interpreters appear to interpret very nearly 
unanimously that there is no single location 
where all of the neuronal signals or action 
potentials are flowing. There isn’t a place 
where “it all comes together” (Dennett, 1991, 
p. 107). If there is no central control room or 
experiencing room – Cartesian Theatre, as 
Dennett puts it – where all of the individuated 
signals combine and arrive as if to be 
represented in a unified experience, then it is 
unclear that there is another way to talk about 
experience other than in a distributed sense. 
“Distributed sense,” rather than a localized 
place where “it all comes together,” suggests 
that experience is smeared out across, at least, 
the central nervous system (CNS). That begs 
the question of what is different about the 
neurons in CNS and PNS? If philosophers of 
mind and neuroscience, or the neuroscientists 
themselves, can’t distinguish the neurons 
then the periphery of the body, as with the 
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PNS, deserves some focus and mention when 
it comes to where experience is.  
 
The second tacit thought is the peculiarity in 
the philosophy of mind literature in 
discussing c-fibers as being identical to pain, 
in that c-fiber firing is what pain is. Authors, 
beginning with Puccetti (1977), have pointed 
out that c-fibers are not themselves a part of 
either the dorsal column-medial lemniscus 
pathway or the lateral corticospinal tract. In 
other words, “they do not themselves project 
any higher [than the receptor cells on the 
spinal cord], and thus are not brain states 
when stimulated” (Puccetti, 1977, p. 303). 
The peculiarity is that philosophers have 
placed so much stock in a Cartesian way of 
thinking, in which the mind is housed by the 
cranial cavity, and yet one of the first 
opportunities philosophers take to discuss 
how the biological “wires” and “hardware” 
are the mental states results in a faux pas of 
placing the mental state outside of the brain. 
While this is a peculiarity on the part of 
identity theorists and adherents of 
functionalism, Aranyosi doesn’t take this 
move as a true faux pas: “[T]he real irony is 
that… they were basically right [that] pain is 
C fiber firing and anything else that involves 
the PNS’s activity within pain states! They 
were right for the wrong reasons” (Aranyosi, 
2013, p. 41). The intuition of placing mental 
states beyond the skull, though not the 
intention of philosophers of mind, coincides 
well with the thinking that experience is 
distributed. With no reason to limit the 
distribution to CNS, the PNS can be taken as 
also possessing mental states. The 
emendation I will make is that the PNS and 
the entire nervous system channels 
experience, acting as a conduit for 
experiences in a Whiteheadian metaphysical 
framework.  
 
As much as The Peripheral Mind is a boon 
for the views taken in this paper, there is 
arguably even more support for a 
Whiteheadian understanding of the PNS from 
the shortcomings of Aranyosi’s book. While 
taking a much more empirical approach, 
noting relevant, well-known facts of 
neuroscience, the book lacks some amount of 
substance in that it doesn’t answer basic 
questions about the conclusions drawn 
throughout. One such issue that I would like 
to address is when Aranyosi says, “The fiber 
can be considered conscious in the sense of 
its activity being constitutive of a conscious 
state, say, a sensory state. What ‘conscious’ 
means at that level is, of course, nothing but 
being active or firing in a certain way, the 
way depending on what global conscious 
state it is a part of” (Aranyosi, 2013, p. 50). 
Problematic is why firing and being active 
takes the fiber from an unconscious state to a 
conscious state. The direction of the book is 
noble and, I think, right-headed, as it 
accounts for empirical, analytic, and 
phenomenological considerations; however, 
I perceive the weakness in the cited stretch of 
text is a problem of metaphysics. The 
Peripheral Mind Hypothesis (PMH), as he 
calls it, is not sufficiently undergirded with a 
metaphysical framework. Such a 
metaphysical framework should 
satisfactorily answer ontological questions, 
such as why a fiber is conscious when it is 
active and not when it isn’t. The apparently 
arbitrary claims don’t stop there. A logical 
extension of the privileged status of firing 
nerve fibers is that Aranyosi sets the 
neuromuscular junctions (NMJs) as sites that 
separate what can be conscious from what is 
never conscious, (i.e., muscle and whatever 
else is on the NMJ that is not, itself, part of 
the PNS). From this, one should detect that 
Aranyosi avoids moving into the realm of 
panpsychism by arbitrarily capping his 
arguments prematurely with stipulations. 
Drawn to their conclusion, the arguments 
could go a few different ways, depending on 
the metaphysics one takes up. For instance, 
9
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one might say that the nerve fibers, in a way, 
take on a constitutive role in consciousness 
whenever they fire, because there is already a 
property in their raw “material” nature, 
namely, a mind-like or mind-constituting 
property, as in some varieties of substance 
neutral monism (Stubenberg, 2016). 
 
The transition in discussion to a proverbial 
Whiteheadian innervation can be made by 
noting, specifically, what Aranyosi’s struggle 
seems to be. As a project, The Peripheral 
Mind (Aranyosi, 2013) seems to rest upon the 
naive materialistic metaphysics of 
neuroscience, which, as discussed in the 
motivation for this paper, is not a tenable 
assumption or set of assumptions. More 
broadly, the materialistic line of thought is 
probably a major contributing factor for 
categories difficulties in philosophy of 
science, such as those generated by the notion 
of natural kinds. In fact, that can be seen in 
The Peripheral Mind, where the author never 
discusses the content of the nervous system at 
a level lower than that of “fibers” or “wires.”  
Thinking about the nervous system in terms 
exclusively for the sake of excitatory post-
synaptic potentials and inhibitory post-
synaptic potentials raises the individual 
neuron to a privileged status without 
considering the roles and relevance of 
intercellular and extracellular fluids – the 
soup of cations and anions (K+, Na+, Cl-, and 
Ca2+) with charged gradients qua “societies 
of electronic occasions,” as Whitehead would 
say (Whitehead, 1929/1985, p. 91). This 
thinking also fails to consider the 
consciousness/unconsciousness status of 
glial cells or components comprising the 
neuron itself. Are voltage-gated ions and 
metabotropic receptors conscious? What 
about when the fiber, the neuron, is 
undergoing an action potential? If one 
considers the physical process occurring 
during depolarization and the firing of the 
action potential, there actually is no one state 
that is the “firing” of the neuron, but it is, 
instead, the series of events. It is far easier 
and more natural to think about the flows of 
ions across membranes and the movement of 
electric potential in the neuron, all, as flows 
and events. For this reason and more, I think 
the best answer to the above-asked questions 
is to formulate the answers in a way that 
makes consciousness a constitutive property 
of the world, and to make the focus of the 
discussion events, not objects or things in a 
piecemeal, disconnected sense. Whitehead’s 
metaphysics is supremely suited for this task. 
 
The consequences of applying Whitehead’s 
process metaphysics and ontology to the 
understanding of the human organism are in 
stark contrast to attempts to understand the 
human organism from within a materialist 
framework. Neuroscience extends its 
machine-speak by extending the use of 
language to axons, referring to them as wires 
in many cases, but almost invariably referring 
to them in such a way as to imply that they 
are carrying signals, integrating signals in 
excitatory and inhibitory ways, and even 
processing signals in ways that are similar to 
binary computational processes (Churchland, 
1986, pp. 210-211; Bear et al., 2016, pp. 132-
140). The conditional assumption that gives 
rise to this perspective is one that supports the 
tyranny of the eye: if it can be seen, it is real, 
and if it cannot be detected by the eye, it is 
not real. In other words, the eye has 
exhaustive access to reality, whether that 
means direct or indirect access. This 
conditional assumption is peculiar for its 
radical contradiction with Seth’s 
hallucination characterization and the 
problematic nature of signal transduction 
(Raven et al., 2005/2014, p. 168). One might 
restate the conditional assumption with 
maximal irony, in the following sort of way: 
hallucinations exhaustively indicate what 
exists and what does not. If drawn out to its 
fullest logical extent, a self-referential truth 
10
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paradox will arise. The speculative process 
philosophy, in connecting the inside and 
outside of the organism, making the 
periphery of the organism no boundary at all, 
leaves room for interpretations as to how one 
should think about what’s going on, if an 
organism is not merely an electro-chemical 
soup with signals floating around in it. The 
interpretation I offer here is one that moves 
away from the hubris of the tyranny of the 
eye, to a humbler conception, specifically, a 
conception that admits that we cannot see all 
of what is going on in the nervous system. 
 
The intent here is not to deny what we see in 
neurophysiology. That there are things 
appearing as signal transmission between 
neurons with propagations down axons, 
seems beyond doubt. However, rather than 
electrons carrying information down a wire, 
it is more sensible to think of these visible 
phenomena as tracers for what is happening. 
The reasoning behind thinking these action 
potentials – or even the recognized smaller 
contents of cells, such as the cations, anions, 
and alpha helix components of ion channels 
– are merely tracers is that Whitehead tells us 
that actual occasions are not fully analyzable, 
but that they can be analyzed in parts through 
modes. “The philosophy of organism is a 
cell-theory of actuality. Each ultimate unit of 
fact is a cell-complex, not analysable into 
components with equivalent completeness of 
actuality” (Whitehead, 1929/1986, p. 219). 
Therefore, I propose that the way one views 
the influx of data from the nervous system be 
such that the flows of information be seen as 
flows of experience. On that score, the PNS 
and CNS can be thought of as a conduit of 
channels that directs experience around 
various pathways. Even this explication is not 
correct in the fullest sense. The view is still a 
bit materialistic and mechanical, thinking of 
experience as a fluid moving a round pipes. 
Just as the electromagnetic field “leaks” out 
of the pipe, that is the wire, so, too, we should 
consider the nervous systems as guides for 
drops of experience, but that not all of which 
remain on the beaten path. With this caveat in 
mind for qualification of my subsequent 
manner of speaking, we can briefly discuss 
the role of the brain. 
 
The swirlings of experience along the paths 
of the neuron somas and down the axons, 
across the synapses of the PNS, CNS, and the 
brain can only be clearly understood if one 
takes the view that the point of the flows is to 
gain a unified large-scale consciousness 
within the organism. Due to the complexity 
and nuances of the interchange of processes 
in the PNS with what happens in the brain, it 
is beyond the scope of this article to discuss 
the brain’s role, specifically. More relevant is 
the role of negative prehensions at the 
peripheries of the organism, which will 
ultimately serve as a prelude to what the brain 
is and does. Of central importance, however, 
one should take stock of the fact that the type 
of content giving rise to each region of the 
body, in terms of giving rise to the structure 
and state of the body in time, is the same. 
That is, the PNS draws in actual occasions, 
and all of what we characterize as the 
contents of the cranium are, likewise, an 
ensemble of actual occasions. While actual 
occasions qualitatively differ in the PNS and 
brain, ontologically speaking, they are 
metaphysically the same type of thing; just as 
oxygen and nitrogen, in the materialist 
metaphysics, are of the same type (i.e., 
matter), while differing in ontological 
quality. 
 
If we look at the human body, as well as 
organisms from earlier ancestral lines that are 
still extant, there is some indication that 
neurophysiology at the periphery is quite 
different, especially in terms of sense organs, 
and it is even clear that organismic to various 
forms of sense data arose in succession. For 
instance, the sudden wide-ranging eruption 
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of vision, as a mode of perception, in the 
Cambrian explosion was a significant event 
in the organismic evolutionary trajectory 
(Trestman, 2013). I argue that we can 
understand this more readily in the realist 
terms of Whitehead’s conception of negative 
prehensions in the PNS and the specialized 
sensory pathways. Taking philosophical 
realism seriously, in simpler lifeforms, one 
would not expect an organism to draw in a 
complex holism of experience through its 
periphery, (i.e., organismic boundary) and 
utilize it comprehensively to perceive the 
environment. Rather, one would expect 
simpler data influx, which then could be used 
in a simplistic way to maintain its survival 
and successfully procreate. In Whitehead’s 
categoreal scheme, chapter two of Process 
and Reality, it includes a conception that 
describes what happens not only in any sense 
organ, but what can occur in any actual 
occasion: negative prehension – an 
elimination of feeling, which “holds its 
datum as inoperative in the progressive 
concrescence of prehensions constituting the 
unity of the subject (Whitehead, 1929/1986, 
pp. 23-24). Instead of viewing nociceptors, 
for example, as engaging in signal 
transduction resulting in pain signals from 
the domain of the skin, one can eliminate 
logical contradictions by viewing this process 
as entailing negative prehensions: with an 
overwhelming totality of feeling existing on 
the outer boundary of the organism, negative 
prehensions permit in a limited amount of 
what is available in the incoming drops of 
experience. Rather than the inundation of an 
infinitude, negative prehension allows for a 
simpler, more manageable influx of feeling. 
On this view, that simpler organisms are even 
without brains should not be very surprising. 
If what an organism is doing is channeling 
inward a small qualitative swathe of what is 
available in the environment, then more 
complex organisms, possessing more 
varieties of sensory experience, would need a 
means to swirl around the “routes of 
experience,” whereby nerves serve as 
swirling paths to mix and combine 
experience. In fact, this is a remixing of what 
is already present in the external world, just 
beyond the horizon of the organism. Here, we 
arrive at a radically new evolutionary 
purpose for what the brain does in giving rise 
to consciousness. However special the brain 
is in the human body, for example, it is not 
quite as unique as the uninitiated might think. 
Let us look deeper into the PNS. 
 
The enteric division (which I will refer to as 
“ENS” for enteric nervous system) of the 
autonomic nervous system (ANS), a division 
of the PNS, has two parts: the myenteric and 
submucous plexuses. They serve as the lining 
and source of innervation of the esophagus, 
stomach, intestines, pancreas, and gall 
bladder. This division is often referred to as 
the “little brain” by the mechanistically-
minded neuroscientists (Bear et al., 2016, p. 
535). Referring to this portion of the ANS as 
a brain used to be only due to the great 
independence with which it operates and the 
hundred million plus neurons contained 
therein. This observation turns out to have a 
deeper connection to the human evolutionary 
history. Researchers in the field of 
neuroscience have found compelling 
evidence to suggest that not only was the 
ENS probably in existence prior to the 
development of the cranially encased brain, 
which may have found its first neurons stem 
from what is now the colon, but the global 
operation of earlier evolutionary ancestors, 
for whatever global direction there was 
within the organism, seems to have been 
handled by the organism’s gut (Furness and 
Stebbing, 2017; Spencer et al., 2018). Two 
decades before these researches elevated the 
status of the ENS, Michael D. Gershon, M.D. 
had taken up the thesis seriously, as his 
interest in the neurotransmitter 5-
HT/serotonin, led him to focus on the gut, the 
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producer of over 95 % of the body’s serotonin 
(Gershon, 1999, p. xii). While Gershon’s 
work largely figures into the treatment of 
disease, directly, such as in addressing the 
poltergeist-like bowel and gut diseases, there 
is tremendous philosophical value in 
considering the ENS as a second brain that 
has self-managing functions and which takes 
on moods, emotional dispositions, and which 
may even be said to have instincts all its 
own.3 
 
What this gut-as-brain thinking does 
philosophically is challenge any left-over 
Cartesian thinking remaining in neuroscience 
and philosophy of mind. To Chalmer’s and 
Clark’s (2012) thinking that cognition “ain’t 
all in the head,” these neuroscientific 
researchers affirm the folk psychology of 
18th and 19th centuries as if to say: yes, we 
knew this all along, but the knowledge of the 
feelings in our guts were persuaded by the 
reasons in our skulls (p. 1). By leaning their 
thought heavily upon phenomenology, Clark 
and Chalmers have generated and developed 
the conception of an extended mind, but the 
idea of embodied knowledge is not widely 
accepted among philosophers, and it isn’t 
even accepted by Aranyosi in his philosophy 
on the PNS. The natural inclination to reject 
thinking about the ENS as a brain, even 
though it may have been the executive before 
there was one housed in a skull, is that one 
might find it difficult to accept that the gut 
has knowledge. In Part III, “Mind Embodied” 
 
3 I’ll leave it for a future endeavor to examine the 
literature of feelings in relation to the gut – an idea 
that has fallen out of favor in the 20th century. 
Sufficient for this discussion is that there is an 
empirical and evolutionary reason for thinking this 
way, as well as a pragmatic reason, in that this way of 
thinking yields to medical application and a 
methodological research program for further inquiry. 
However, the reader’s mind should, tout de suite, go 
back to the 18th and 19th century, when dispositional 
and emotional sense were lent to the gut; and to the 
history of philosophical thought, which afforded 
in The Peripheral Mind, Aranyosi resists 
many of the conclusions argued for by 
embodied minded, despite the fact that he’s 
presenting a kind of “enminded body” 
approach; and one of these conclusions he 
dismisses is knowledge in the PNS. 
Aranyosi’s mantra seems to be that all 
aspects of cognition are constitutive in the 
presence of some higher order manifestation: 
PNS firing, for example, is constitutive of a 
global awareness. Thus, I think he would say 
that a nerve cell firing is conscious in the 
body, in concert with those other constitutive 
firings, though not in vitro. The problem 
appears to be one of method. Analytically-
minded philosophy views the world as 
building upwards from parts, and so this is a 
preeminent feature of Aranyosi’s thought. It 
precludes the gut from having knowledge, 
primarily, because there isn’t a sensible way 
to discuss abstract knowledge in the ENS – 
not that there is one for the cerebral cortex! 
The aspect of construction in Aranyosi’s 
PMH is clear when one appreciates that he 
views the sense organs and PNS as one would 
roots of a tree, and where the roots draw in 
water the sense organs and PNS play a 
necessary and unique role in how the 
organism experiences the world.4 “[A] 
precise recreation of the experience of the 
external world will have to involve the 
peripheral reconstruction of a body, with all 
its relevant components, not only neural but 
hormonal and anatomical” (Aranyosi, 2013, 
p. 24). This thinking shines with brilliance as 
deeper significance to the quality of digestion as it 
relates to the whole person. 
4 I admit the shortcoming of this analogy in a number 
of respects. What tree roots draw in are the same as 
what is within the tree roots; and this is 
Whiteheadian, not what Aranyosi wants to say. As an 
aside, the tree root is an excellent representation of 
the nervous system as a Whiteheadian “nervous 
system ecology,” similar to what Allan Combs 
(2011) communicates through a Lynn Margulis quote 
about the true nature of nerves in Ch. 3 of The 
Radiance of Being.  
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Aranyosi meets the question of, “What is it 
like to be a bat?,” with, “What is it like to be 
this bat versus that bat?” The philosophy 
developed is laudable, but the shortcoming in 
this is that it leaves no room for the gut to 
possess knowledge.5 Whitehead’s 
philosophy of organism allows for the 
“constitutive” element that Aranyosi’s PMH 
explicitly needs, without committing to any 
notion of a constructed experience. This is 
made possible through concrescence, 
prehension (especially, the idea of negative 
prehension), and the specific metaphysical 
makeup of the world, namely, actual 
occasions. This framework replaces our 
modern mechanical materialistic view of 
what happens at the organism’s boundary, so 
as to draw in the drops of experience, the 
actual occasions. All cells – each being 
societies of actual occasions – in various 
ways, will serve as portals or inward flows of 
experience through prehension. Philosophers 
and scientists tend to think of the sensory 
organ pathways (e.g., the auditory pathway) 
as carrying the only elements of experience, 
but with the shift to Whitehead’s philosophy, 
drops of experience are prehended along the 
entire outer manifold and envelop of the 
organism. The focus by philosophers and 
scientists on sense organs is entirely because 
of the relatively systematic fashion in which 
these pathways can access information, but 
the benefit and stability of drawing in a 
limited swathe of experience to be analyzed 
systematically comes at the cost of negative 
prehension. These pathways cut out some 
experience, allowing in more uniformly 
mode-specific varieties of what we 
 
5 It is worth taking the moment to remind ourselves 
that the framework in which experience is 
constructed fails, and this was addressed as one of the 
motivations of this paper in the opening salvo. 
6 I include this particular bit, as it shows the 
metaphysical solution to the question posed by 
William James regarding how things outside of the 
organism might pass into the organism, considering, 
for example, a red cube outside of the organism is 
commonly mean by “sense experience” – 
each pathway drawing in its own specific 
feeling (e.g., aspects of vision). To put it 
squarely for the newcomer to Whitehead’s 
philosophy, “With the purpose of obtaining a 
one-substance cosmology, ‘prehensions’ are 
a generalization from Descartes’ mental 
‘cogitations,’ and from Locke’s ‘ideas,’ to 
express the most concrete mode of analysis 
applicable to every grade of individual 
actuality” (Whitehead, 1929/1985, p. 19).6 
Organisms are finite beings, and so the 
capacity to make sense of the whole drops of 
experience not entering through the sense 
organs, usually go without much conscious 
awareness; however, sometimes they 
mysteriously rise to the point of salient 
consciousness even if not fully 
understandable. For the parts of the sensory 
world that we have come to know from the 
supposed “five senses” we tend to give all the 
credit,  but one should not cede to the tyranny 
of the eye, so to speak, assuming that the 
finite sense modalities of our human 
experience is exhaustive. Whitehead’s 
speculative philosophy suggests it is not 
exhaustive. Moreover, there is a seeming 
endless run of documented experience 
through various intellectual disciplines or in 
personal accounts wherein the experiences 
are mystical, whether that means they are not 
reproducible or are inexplicable in terms of 
our common modes of sense. The history of 
literature is peppered with unusual human 
experiences that are consistent with 
experience that is not derived from sense 
organs.7 One example comes in a passage of 
Joseph Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness:  
extended and read, whereas the cube inside the 
organism’s boundary is neither actually red nor 
actually a cube (James, p. 487). There is no extended, 
red-colored thing inside the organism’s boundary, 
though it is red and extended in the mind. 
7 Whitehead’s lingo does cover this conception 
formally with the terminology of “presentational 
immediacy” (Whitehead, 1929/1985, p. 121). I have 
consciously pulled back a bit on the Whiteheadian 
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“The fact is I was completely 
unnerved by a sheer blank fright, pure 
abstract terror, unconnected with any 
distinct shape of physical danger. 
What made this emotion so 
overpowering was – how shall I 
define it? –  the moral shock I 
received, as if something altogether 
monstrous, intolerable to thought and 
odious to the soul, had been thrust 
upon me unexpectedly. This lasted of 
course the merest fraction of a 
second…” (Conrad, 1902, pp. 107-
108)  
 
The experience was not anchored in sensory 
modalities, which is why it was a “blank 
fright” and a “pure abstract terror.”8 Within 
the ambit of Whitehead’s philosophy, the 
experience is quite intelligible, since one can 
have experiences that are not so directly 
contingent upon the data coming in from 
sense organs. Another example is Mrs. 
Gradgrind in Dicken’s Hard Times, when 
Mrs. Gradgrind experiences a pain that is in 
the room (Dickens, 1854/2001).  
 
Revisiting the ENS with a mind toward 
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, the 
idea of gut feelings and experiences, 
especially somatic experiences, that do not 
seem to hinge on sensory organ input. Instead 
of electrical signals pulsing around the body, 
we can think in terms of the feelings or drops 
of experience (or actual occasions) swirling 
about the organism, mostly, but not 
exclusively, in the PNS – and the PNS is a 
 
vocabulary, seeking a “middle way,” choosing to 
employ only those bits of verbiage that are 
unavoidable for the discussions of the philosophy of 
organism in this paper. 
8 To reduce the concern that we are merely speaking 
from a vapid point of fiction, Whitehead provides 
more concrete experiences that are not grounded in 
presentational immediacy. One example of particular 
power is causation or causal connection, which one 
series of conduits and canals channeling 
drops of experience, ushering them to other 
parts of the organism. In so thinking, we 
arrive back at a common understanding of 
how experiences or feelings are processed “in 
the gut,” such as in Nietzsche’s reference to 
this in his On the Genealogy of Morals: “If 
someone cannot cope with his ‘psychic 
sufferings,’ this does not stem from his 
psyche, to speak crudely; more probably 
from his stomach…A strong and well-formed 
man digests his experiences (including deeds 
and misdeeds) as he digests his meals, even 
when he has hard lumps to swallow” 
(Nietzsche, 1887/2013, p. 95). The common 
experience of gut feelings, whether about 
immediate dangers or the experiences of love 
or in moral consideration, lends to the 
decentralization of cognition leading it away 
from the throne of its former glory, spreading 




The problems for philosophy of mind and 
neuroscience presented here, namely, the 
problem of signal transduction and the 
problem of where to go after the exorcism of 
mechanistic philosophy, I have suggested a 
resolution through by implementing 
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. While 
the current scientific take, viewing the 
nervous system as merely electrical in nature, 
Whitehead’s metaphysical view of 
“substance” is one that dismisses with the 
mechanistic, materialistic world. It opts for a 
world of events, drops of experience, which 
can combine in the constitutive fashion that 
might either deny like Hume, as it seemed to be a 
kind of “pure abstract terror” to Hume. The point is 
that not all of what exists in our world is given in 
presentational immediacy, despite there being very 
strong evidence for it. And the evidence of feelings 
that arise, not appended to sense organ data, are 
indicative of things in the world as shown in fictional 
literature. 
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Aranyosi (2013) discusses. This also 
eliminates the problem of signal 
transduction, because the kind of thing on the 
outside of the organism is the kind of thing 
that exists on the inside of the organismic 
boundary: actual occasions/drops of 
experience/feelings. The analyzed content of 
each incoming actual occasion may be 
different and sense organs of an organism 
may draw in a specific type of feeling through 
negative prehension, but it remains the case 
that these modes are drawing from the same 
kind of ontological and metaphysical entity, 
actual occasions, which we do just as well to 
think of as drops of experience. The process 
and reality of the nervous system, then, is one 
of actual occasions producing a swirling buzz 
along the neuronal conduits. The body is 
furnished throughout with experience, 
provided by the rise of new actual occasions 
from other constantly concrescing and 
satisfying occasions. In this Whiteheadian 
innervation, the living organism is brought to 
life with the satisfaction of feeling, which is 
situated in a realist ontology devoid of 
debilitating internal inconsistencies. 
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